Cruel puzzles

Last week, on this page, I commented upon the process that led to the approval of the law on animal protection. I argued that the common citizen could feel some perplexity about the long discussion and approval process and its incidents. I suppose we can appropriately say the same about some of the law provisions. They are also disconcerting to say the least.
For starters, just have a look at Article 3. It deals with what is supposedly the main subject of the law, animal mistreatment. First, in no ambiguous terms, it is stated that ‘torture,’ ‘cruel’ or ‘violent’ acts that cause ‘pain and suffering’ to animals are forbidden. Then, some exceptions are accepted. Namely, when the act is not ‘reproachable’ or when the means used are not ‘irrational’. These statements raise questions. Do they mean that there are forms of ‘torture,’ ‘cruel’ or ‘violent’ treatment of animals that are not reproachable? That torture or violent actions, as long as conducted in a ‘rational’ manner, are acceptable? Will someone explain or, at least, provide some examples of behaviour that might fit those exceptions?
If we read the previous Article in combination with Article 25, the puzzlement can only increase. The latter defines what we should understand as a crime of ‘cruelty’. This requires, cumulatively, that someone: first – uses ‘cruel or violent or torturous means’; second – with the intention to ‘cause pain and suffering to an animal’; and third – which results in ‘serious mutilation, loss of important organs or death’. Let us try to understand the standard for cruelty apparently implied.
So, to be clear: the means used must be cruel (some circularity here?); there is intention to cause pain; and the result is serious mutilation (not defined), loss of important organs (not identified) or death (that, at least, is clear and verifiable). If the mutilation is not too severe and the body parts lost are not too critical, it seems there is no crime of cruelty in the legal, technical sense defined by the law. All of which appears to imply that some kinds of cruel treatment or torture are tolerable, provided they are ‘light’ (‘no vital organ lost’) or accidental (‘no intention really, it was a mishap’).
Several years in preparation, almost two years in deliberation and this is the outcome: imprecise scope, ambiguous rules and assorted exceptions, open to wide interpretations. Can one not be perplexed?